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Deciphering Heidegger’s Connection
with the Daodejing
Lin Ma
This paper carries out an intensive study of Heidegger’s famous reflection on the word
dao and of his citations from the Daodejing, with the purpose of elucidating his complex
relation with Daoist thinking. First I examine whether dao could be said to be a
guideword for Heidegger’s path of thinking. Then I discuss Heidegger’s citations, in six
places of his writings, from five chapters of the Daodejing, by situating them in the
immediate textual context as well as against the broad background of the fundamental
presuppositions and orientations of Heidegger and Laozi’s thinking. My examination of
Heidegger’s citations from the Daodejing has for the first time gathered together all the
relevant materials discovered so far.
It has been widely known that Heidegger engaged with Paul Shih-yi Hsiao in the
summer of 1946 to translate a number of chapters from the Daodejing.1 This story
has been taken as the most convincing basis for the claim that Heidegger has
integrated Daoist themes into his central thought and thus he is a trans-cultural
thinker. In my view, it may well be the case that Heidegger carried on conversations
with Hsiao with respect to the text of several chapters from the Daodejing.
Nevertheless, the mere actuality of such an event cannot warrant exceedingly positive
interpretations in relation to a ‘dialogue’ between Heidegger and Laozi.
Because of limitation of space, in this paper I refrain from investigating the
ambiguities and controversies surrounding this event. Rather, I focus on the other
points of Heidegger’s connection with the Daodejing and attempt to elucidate his
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complex relation with Daoist thinking. In the first place, I inquire into Heidegger’s
reflection on and reference to the word dao ( ) respectively in ‘The nature of
language’ (1957/58) and ‘The principle of identity’ (1957). I point out that, only
when interpreted in the particular manner, or thought in its proper nature as
Heidegger may ascribe to it, can dao be said to refer to Weg. Weg is the standard
against which dao is measured. This is because Weg is the primary and grounding
word-thing in Heidegger’s thought.
The rest of this paper is devoted to careful studies of Heidegger’s citations from the
Daodejing. According to my archival and textual investigation, Heidegger has cited
from five chapters of the Daodejing (chapters 28, 11, 9, 47, 15) respectively in the
lecture ‘Basic principles of thinking’ (1957), the essay ‘The uniqueness of the poet’
(1943), and the address ‘To the seventieth birthday of Siegfried Bro¨se on August 8,
1965’ (the latter two have remained unpublished until 2000), as well as in three
letters: the letter to Ernst Ju¨nger on 29 May 1965, the letter to Hsiao on 9 October
1947, and the letter to Andrea von Harbou on 6 August 1965. The last-mentioned
letter is a new archival discovery concerning Heidegger’s connection with the
Daodejing. In addition, in his letter to Erhart Ka¨stner on 30 July 1973, Heidegger
makes a comment on chapter 15 of the Daodejing without quoting the related verses.
This document has hardly been noted.
My examination of Heidegger’s citations from the Daodejing has for the first time
gathered together all the relevant materials discovered so far. I present scrupulous
analyses of those citations by situating them in the immediate textual context as well
as against the broad background of the fundamental presuppositions and
orientations of Heidegger and Laozi’s thinking.2
1. Dao and Weg
‘The nature of language’, where Heidegger’s famous reflection on dao appears,
consists of three lectures that he delivered at the University of Freiburg in 1957 and
1958. According to Heidegger, these three lectures are aimed at ‘bring[ing] us face to
face with a possibility of undergoing an experience with language’ (Heidegger, 1971,
p. 57/p. 159).3 The first lecture tries to achieve this by focusing on Stefan George’s
poem ‘The word’. This lecture moves in the neighbourhood of poetry and thinking.
The second lecture contrasts method with way. Method is derived from the
corruption and degeneration of way. It is characterized by technical–scientific
calculation. Heidegger does not conform to the common view according to which
method is connected with scientific instruments or tools. For him, method is more
primary than those. It is what has pressed science into its own service (cf. p. 74/
p. 178). In contrast, Weg (way) belongs in the region (Gegend) that is the freeing and
sheltering clearing. This freeing–sheltering is a kind of way-making (Be-we¨gung), in
which ways that belong to the region are generated. Weg is that which allows humans
to reach what concerns and summons them. The third lecture elaborates on the
guide-word (Leitwort) that accompanies the region, that is, ‘The being [Wesen] of
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language: the language of being’ (p. 94/p. 200). Language is proper to what moves all
things, and what moves all things moves in that it speaks. What concerns humans as
language ‘receives its definition from Saying as that which moves all things’ (p. 95/
p. 202).Weg is concerned with the way in which humans undergo an experience with
Saying, that is, with the nature of language.
Heidegger’s meditation on dao appears in the beginning of the third lecture when
he is summarizing the second one. In explaining that the word Be-we¨gung should
be taken in the sense of ‘to be the original giver and founder of ways’ (p. 92/p. 198),
Heidegger provides a gloss on the etymological connections and usage in the Swabian
dialect of the German verb bewegen and its German cognates.4 Following this, he
inserts a discussion consisting of two paragraphs in which the word dao appears five
times. For the convenience of discussion, I quote these two paragraphs one by one.
The first paragraph runs:
The word ‘way’ probably is a primal word [Urwort] of language that speaks to the
reflective mind of man. The guideword [Leitwort] in Laotse’s poetic thinking is
Tao, which ‘properly speaking’ [‘eigentlich’] refers to [bedeutet] way. But because
we are prone to think of ‘way’ superficially, as a stretch connecting two places, our
word ‘way’ has all too rashly been considered unfit to name what Tao says. Tao is
then translated as reason [Vernunft], spirit [Geist], raison [Raison], meaning [Sinn],
logos. (1971, p. 92/p. 198; tr. m.)
In this paragraph, Heidegger notes that Weg is probably an Urwort, and that dao, the
Leitwort of Laozi’s ‘poetic thinking’, ‘properly speaking’, refers to Weg. Then he
regrets that Weg is often understood as a path stretching from one place to another,
so it has been regarded as unsuitable for translating dao. Consequently, dao is
rendered as Vernunft, Geist, Raison, Sinn, Logos. This recognizance may be partially
based on Hegel’s explanation of dao. The following are three comments on dao by
Hegel:
Dao-dao: Direction, law of reason. [. . .] Abel Re´sumat says that the best way it [i.e.,
dao] might be expressed is by the Greek word !o"o#. (Lectures on the History of
Philosophy)
Dao is generally called the way [Weg], the right way of spirit, i.e., ‘reason’. (Lectures
on the Philosophy of Religion)
The principle [of Chinese thought] is Vernunft, dao, this everything underlying
essence, which moves [bewirkt] everything. (Lectures on the Philosophy of History)5
Note that Hegel was already using Weg to explain the meaning of dao, though he
seems to equate Weg with the notions of Geist and Vernunft. One may speculate that
Heidegger has borrowed Hegel’s word bewirkt. Hence, it is somewhat surprising that
Heidegger claims that the word Weg has been ‘considered unfit to name what dao
says’.6 In making such a claim, Heidegger does not seem to be concerned with the
question how dao should be translated; rather, his purpose is to enhance the unique
sense he ascribes to his notion of Weg.
Checking the four German versions of the Daodejing that Heidegger has quoted
from or consulted,7 one finds that Victor von Strauss leaves dao untranslated, but
adds in a note (1924, 1n 1) that dao should not be translated as Weg, Wort or
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Vernunft, but as God. Alexander Ular (1903) translates dao as Bahn (way, course).
Richard Wilhelm (1911) renders dao as Sinn, alluding to the beginning of St John’s
Gospel where logos is sometimes translated as Sinn. Heidegger may have this in mind
when he includes Sinn into his list of translations. Jan Ulenbrook (1962) translates
dao as Weg (it was published after Heidegger delivered the lectures ‘The nature of
language’ in 1957/58). Other German translations of dao in the first half of the
twentieth century include ‘the unfathomable’ (das Unergru¨ndliche) and ‘the essence’
(das Wesen). The contemporary versions either translate dao as Weg or leave it
untranslated.
The second paragraph in which Heidegger discusses dao runs:
Yet Tao could be the way that gives all ways [der alles be-we¨gende Weg], that which
makes possible our power to think what reason, mind, meaning [Sinn], logos may
say properly, that is, by their proper nature. Perhaps the mystery of mysteries of
thoughtful Saying [denkenden Sagens] conceals itself in the word Weg, Tao, if only
we will let these names return to what they leave unspoken, if only we are capable
of this, to allow them to do so. Perhaps the enigmatic power of today’s reign of
method also, and indeed preeminently, stems from the fact that the methods,
notwithstanding their efficiency, are after all merely the drainage of a great hidden
stream which moves [be-we¨gt] all things along its track-drawing way [seine Bahn
reißenden Weges]. All is way. (1971, p. 92/p. 198; tr. m.)
In this place, Heidegger suggests that dao could be the Weg that gives all ways, as that
which makes possible for humans to think through what reason, mind, meaning, and
logos may say out of their nature. In the second sentence, Heidegger seems to take
Weg and dao as synonyms in saying that ‘[p]erhaps the mystery of mysteries of
thoughtful saying conceals itself in the word Weg, Tao’. However, for sure, he is not
suggesting that these two words are completely identical, because he immediately
refers back to them in the plural, in terms of ‘these names’. The final remark, ‘All is
way’ follows up what is asserted in the preceding. Methods are the drainage of Weg
that moves all things. Weg is that from which all the variety of methods arise in
various forms. It is in this sense that Heidegger says, ‘All is way’.8
When discussing Ereignis in ‘The principle of identity’ (originally delivered as a
lecture in 1957), Heidegger says:
The word Ereignis, thought in terms of the matter indicated, should now speak as
a guideword (Leitwort) in the service of thinking. As such a guideword, it can no
more be translated than the Greek !o"o& or the Chinese Tao. (Heidegger, 1969,
p. 36/p. 101)
This fleeting reference to dao has been ascribed a great deal of importance. In relation
to it, Cho claims that dao can be called ‘an other way’ (ein anderer Gang) and that dao
is the Leitwort of Heidegger’s thinking (Cho, 1993, p. 150).9
Cho’s claim seems to be insufficiently convincing. As a matter of fact, it is Ereignis
that Heidegger says should speak as a Leitwort of thinking. Ereignis can no more
be translated than the Chinese dao can. Their juxtaposition does not indicate
Heidegger’s adoption of dao as the Leitwort of his thinking (or, thinking as such). At
most it means that, to the same degree in which Ereignis speaks as a Leitwort of
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thinking, dao speaks as the Leitwort of ancient Chinese thinking. Heidegger leaves
unaddressed whether and how Ereignis can be related to dao. Immediately after the
remark cited above, Heidegger stresses the uniqueness and singularity of Ereignis.
He writes:
The term Ereignis here no longer means what we would otherwise call a happening
[Geschehnis], an occurrence [Vorkommnis]. It now is used as a singulare tantum.
What it indicates happens only in the singular, no, not in any number, but
uniquely [einzig]. (1969, p. 36/p. 101)
To elucidate the nature of the relation between Weg and dao in Heidegger’s writings,
I would like to call for aid Frege’s (1980) terminology of sense (Sinn) and reference
(Bedeutung). First of all, as a guideword of Laozi’s thinking, dao is untranslatable.
Yet, ‘properly speaking’ (eigentlich), dao refers to (bedeutet) Weg. Therefore, Weg
could be said to be the Bedeutung of dao. However, dao cannot be said to be identical
or freely interchangeable with Weg; at least it does not share the same Sinn as Weg.
The ambiguous relation between Weg and dao provides possibilities of both
universalist and relativist readings of Heidegger’s thought. On the one hand, a
universalist reading would consider that Weg and dao share the same reference, but
have different senses. That is the basis on which Weg and dao could enter into
dialogue. A relativist reading, on the other hand, would presuppose thatWeg and dao
have different sets of reference and sense. Therefore, there cannot be an intelligible
dialogue between them.
In my view, both universalist and relativist readings neglect the fact that Heidegger
does not treat Weg as merely a linguistic sign that refers to an object through the
mediation of a certain sense. As the proper Urwort, Weg itself is a special entity. Weg
has a kind of giveness or grantedness in spite of its appearance as a word. In other
words, its sense and reference are not external, but internal. Both universalist and
relativist readings fail to recognize the uniqueness of Weg, whose reference and sense
are not on the same par as that of other words. Weg is what makes possible the
experience of the nature of language; it is that in which the thoughtful Saying of
language conceals itself. In this light, it would be more appropriate to describeWeg as
the primary and grounding word-thing, rather than as a word among other words.
It is only ‘properly speaking’ (eigentlich) that dao can be said to refer to Weg. This
means that only when interpreted in the particular manner, or thought in its proper
nature as Heidegger may ascribe to it, can dao come into relation with Weg. Weg is
the standard against which dao is measured. The same consideration applies to the
relation between Ereignis and dao. In fact, with Heidegger,Weg is thought in a similar
fashion as Ereignis is. Like Ereignis, Weg is associated with a sense of movement.
Heidegger coins a word be-we¨gen on the basis of bewegen, and speaks of Weg as that
which moves all things.10 As a special word-thing, Weg expresses a similar movement
as Ereignis, a movement of reversal by means of which both humans and language are
returned to their proper nature.
In any case, Heidegger does not grant dao the same status as Weg, nor does he
assert that Weg is no more than a translation for dao. It is Weg, not dao, that is
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properly Heidegger’s guideword. This is an initial conclusion I draw from a reading
of Heidegger’s references to dao. In the following, I consider Heidegger’s citations
from five chapters of the Daodejing one by one.
2. Light and Darkness—Chapter 28
In the lecture ‘Basic principles of thinking’ delivered in 1957 in Freiburg, Heidegger
quotes a verse from chapter 28 of the Daodejing. In the following I expose the context
in which this quotation occurs.
The basic principles of thinking in the Western philosophical tradition are: the law
of identity, the law of contradiction, and the law of excluded middle. According to
Heidegger, it is with Fichte and Hegel (on the basis prepared by Kant) that these laws
are seriously deliberated on for the first time. They bring the laws of thinking to
a higher dimension of possibility in that thinking becomes essentially dialectical.
Heidegger distinguishes between dimension in the ordinary sense and dimension in
the world-historic (weltgeschichtlicher) sense. The dimension with which he is
concerned is the latter one.
Heidegger points out that our ordinary thinking does not follow those
‘fundamental’ laws of thinking but contradicts them. This kind of contradiction is
the root of all movements and liveliness. Citing Ho¨lderlin’s verses ‘life is death, and
death is also life’, Heidegger claims that here contradiction unfolds itself as ‘that
which unites and abides’ (das Einigende und Wa¨hrende) (Heidegger, 1976, p. 51/
p. 87). Invoking Novalis’ remark that ‘to deny the logical law of contradiction is
perhaps the highest task of logic’, Heidegger states that this remark says exactly what
Hegel is thinking, that is, one has to deny the law of contradiction in order to save
contradiction as the law of the reality of the real (p. 52/p. 88).
For Heidegger, the origin of the basic principles of thinking and the place of
thinking these principles are the same thing. Both of them remain concealed (bleibt
gehu¨llt) in the darkness (Dunkel), which is the secret of light (Lichten). Darkness
keeps light within it; and light belongs to darkness. Heidegger cites from Ho¨lderlin’s
poem ‘Remembrance’ (ibid.):
But it passes,
full of dark light,
to me the fragrant cup
Heidegger explains, ‘light is not Lichtung any more, if light is merely brightness,
‘‘brighter than one thousand suns’’ ’. It remains difficult to safeguard the purity of
darkness. That is to say, we have to keep far away the intermixing of inappropriate
brightness in order to find the light that goes with darkness’ (p. 56/p. 93). At this
point, Heidegger cites from the Daodejing:
Laozi says (chapter 28, translated by V. v. Strauss): ‘Who knows his light, will
remain covered in his darkness’ [Wer seine Helle kennt, sich in sein Dunkel hu¨llt]. To
this we add the truth which we all know but few are capable of: mortal thinking has
to go into the depth of a well in order to see the stars. This is difficult. It is even
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more difficult to protect the purity of darkness, which is being interfered by a light
that will only shine. That which only shines, does not give light. The scholastic
presentation of the doctrine of laws of thinking just shines in such a way, as if the
content of these laws and their absolute validity become clear at once to everyone.
(p. 56/p. 93)11
The Chinese original of this verse is:
zhi qi bai, shou qi hei
In knowing the white, one needs to safeguard the black.
What Heidegger quotes is from von Strauss’ translation (von Strauss, 1924, p. 140).12
The import of the original verse concerns the relation between polarities. In quoting
this verse, Heidegger shifts away from this concern.13 His focus does not fall upon the
relation between white and black, or between light and darkness, but on a different
kind of light that he is seeking.
According to Heidegger, Western philosophical tradition has been searching for
inappropriate brightness. This is manifest in the presumption that the basic
principles of thinking are clear and distinct without ambiguity or opaqueness. For
Heidegger, this kind of light is not Lichtung. It is pure brightness without proper
sophistication. One needs to keep away from this simplistic notion of brightness and
look for the appropriate brightness that goes well with darkness. True light lies
concealed in the darkness that is both the origin of the basic principles of thinking
and the place of thinking these principles. Similarly, true darkness is not complete
darkness without any light at all. It is pregnant with profound light.
In this framework of thinking, Heidegger may have found Laozi’s verse concerning
the dialectic relation between white (light) and black (darkness) well-serving his
purpose of delineating an other kind of light, a deeper and more concealed origin of
thinking.14 He adapts the literally ambiguous verse to what he is trying to say in the
relevant context.
Heidegger’s characterization of the origin of the basic principles of thinking in
terms of true light concealed in true darkness resembles his description of truth (and
of Being). To him, truth resides in a-lethia. It is unconcealment with reserved
concealment. Concealment is a fundamental dimension of truth. Truth lies in the
movement towards unconcealment which is continuously challenged or thwarted by
the power of concealment.15 With Heidegger, the dynamic relation between the
unconcealment and concealment, between light and darkness, is one in which each
member of a relevant pair of contraries is indispensable. This appears to be similar to
Laozi’s idea about contraries as reflected in chapter 28.
However, there are two points of difference that set Heidegger away from Laozi.
In the following, I sketch my views concerning their difference. First, according
to Heidegger’s characterization of unconcealment and concealment, of light and
darkness, neither member of the pair of contraries has a determinate external
reference. They represent internal mediation achieved by a movement called a-lethia.
Although Heidegger’s interpreters have often construed this movement as
characteristic of an essential openness, one should notice that a-lethia is not a
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neutral, arbitrary movement. What can be unconcealed presumably is already
unconcealed partially in the first beginning of Western historicality. Unconcealment
is a movement that possesses historic necessity. With Laozi, the opposites are
externally recognizable and determinable. The distinction between the opposites is
not logical, but concrete.16 The white and the black in the verse ‘know the white, yet
safeguard the black’ do not constitute two internal sides of a certain logical or historic
unity. They refer to concrete whiteness and blackness, or to concrete light and
darkness.
Second, sometimes Heidegger speaks of Being in terms of ‘the single source’,
the ‘origin’. This lends itself to the interpretation that he privileges a kind of
metaphysical reservedness, a source that is inexhaustible, a super-concealment that
makes possible any movement of unconcealment with concealment. However, in the
last analysis, Heidegger’s most original contribution to contemporary continental
philosophy is his emphasis on a kind of dynamic movement named as Ereignis, which
features truth (and Being). No determinate way of being is taken as primordial and
fundamental. What is primordial is none other than this momentary movement,
or occurrence, or anticipation for this movement, which makes possible both
unconcealment and concealment, both Being and man in each of their ownmost
nature, both accomplishment and thwartedness, both authenticity and inauthenti-
city. The nature of ‘single source’ and of ‘origin’ rests upon this mode of founding act
or movement. In contrast, Laozi does not seem to presuppose a singular movement
in which opposites are enacted at the same time. His key word dao can be interpreted
in terms of movement. However, there are different kinds of dao and thus different
kinds of movement, for example, tiandao (heaven’s dao, ), and rendao (humans’
dao, ). Different kinds of things in the world also have their own daos.
3. Sages do not Travel?—Chapter 47
In a letter to Ernst Ju¨nger (dated 29 May 1965), just before Ju¨nger set upon a journey
to East Asia, Heidegger quotes the whole of chapter 47 of the Daodejing as translated
by Jan Ulenbrook.17 Below are the Chinese original, the German version in
Heidegger’s letter, and my English translation of this chapter (see Table 1).
Heidegger keeps to all of Ulenbrook’s text except for one place in the fourth line. It
was originally ‘und des Himmels Weg sehen’.18 Himmel’s Weg (tiandao )
literally means heaven’s way(s). Should dao be one of his favourite Leitworten, it is
difficult to explain why Heidegger drops the word Weg (which translates dao) and
changes the translation to ‘und den Himmel ganz sehen’. The expression ‘the whole
of heaven’ may have to do with his idea of the unitary oneness of heaven, earth, god
and man.19
Heidegger sharply criticizes any exoticist interest in and adventure to the foreign.
In his lectures on Ho¨lderlin’s hymn ‘The Ister’, he speaks disparagingly of ‘whatever
is merely foreign in the sense of the alien and exotic, that which the adventurer sets
out in search of in order to settle his conscience’ (Heidegger, 1996, p. 131/p. 164).
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For him, Ju¨nger is the prime example of this way of attending to the foreign.20 One
may say that Heidegger is using Laozi to illustrate his point that one needs to
concentrate on what belongs to one’s own world, instead of going after distant and
strange things outside. Would this be what Laozi is edifying in these verses?
Laozi does say something to the effect that one does not need to bother about the
outer world in order to acquire better knowledge and more skilful practice. This is an
idea which Heidegger may have found catering to his taste. However, Laozi does not
claim that not going outward constitutes the necessary condition for knowing and of
practice. His point is that one needs to concentrate on what is within access, instead
of chasing after superfluous things impertinent to what is at issue. This holds true
especially in Laozi’s time, when, with frequent wars, everything fell into a chaotic
condition and travelling was sometimes almost equal to emigration or exile. Laozi’s
idea may also be targeted against those political strategists who travelled to various
states with the purpose of obtaining power and position by doing such things as
persuading the kings to instigate wars.
As Ames and Hall point out, the commonly consulted Wang Bi version of the
Daodejing has for the last line bu wei er cheng ( ) which literally means ‘And
gets things done without doing’; whereas both Mawangdui A and B texts have fu wei
er cheng ( ), which literally means ‘And gets things done without doing
something’. Since the two lines preceding this are missing in the Mawangdui texts,
one could well extrapolate this sentence structure starting with the word fu, and
assume that both these lines have fu and thus a similar meaning. This is because fu
is a negation word that entails an object after the verb it negates, while bu does
not. Ames and Hall translate the last three lines as (Ames & Hall, 2003, p. 150):
It is for this reason that sages know without going anywhere out of the ordinary,
Understand without seeing anything out of the ordinary,
And get things done without doing anything out of the ordinary.
Table 1 Chapter 47 of the Daodejing.
Nicht zum Tor hinausgehen
und die Welt kennen
One does not need to go beyond one’s
house
To know the world
Nicht zum Fenster One does not need to look outside one’s
hinausspa¨hen
und den Himmel ganz sehen
window
To know the dao of heaven
Geht man sehr weit hinaus,
weiss man sehr wenig
The farther one goes,
The less one knows
Darum der Weise For this reason, sages know
nicht reist er, doch er kennt Without going anywhere out
of the necessary
nicht guckt er, doch er ru¨hmt Understand without seeing anything
out of the necessary
nicht handelt er doch er vollendet And get things done without doing
anything out of the necessary
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Ames and Hall’s point is that Laozi is expressing a localistic view of knowledge. That
is, knowledge is obtained through ‘responsive and efficacious participation in ones’
environments, and through one’s full contribution at home in the local and the focal
relationships that, in sum, make one who one is’ (p. 150). Ames and Hall have made
an important contribution to revealing the sentence meaning of the last three verses,
and they rightly stress the role participation in one’s environments plays in the
constitution of knowledge. However, to state Laozi’s view exclusively in terms of
localism (or contextualism) may risk taking the local as something immutable
and self-evident. Ames and Hall place such a strong emphasis on the local that,
for them, leaving home would endanger one’s defining roles and relationships. They
even take concentrating on local life as a necessary condition for knowing the world
(p. 151).21 This interpretation is suggestive of deterministic ideas that do not accord
with Laozi’s fundamental insight that there are many ways of going about in the
world.
In my view, what Laozi stresses is not that knowledge is definitely acquired
through focusing on the local and the ordinary, but that, to obtain knowledge, or
dao, one does not need to be concerned with impertinent matters. The negation word
fu entails an object for the verb wei On this ground, the misunderstanding that
the sages need not do anything can be cleared up. The point is that they need not do
unnecessary things. So, I follow Ames and Hall’s exegesis about the sentence meaning
of the last three line based on the findings from the Mawangdui texts, but disagree on
the interpretation they ascribe to it.
In Heidegger’s times, convenient means for travelling and transportation makes
going beyond one’s dwelling place much easier and even necessary. It could be said
that one’s dwelling place has been significantly broadened and become more
complex. Often necessity arises for one to travel afar, which could not be imagined in
ancient times. Heidegger’s awareness of this is shown in what he writes in the
beginning of the essay ‘The Thing’:
Man now reaches overnight, by plane, places which formerly took weeks and
months of travel. He now receives instant information, by radio, of events which he
formerly learned about only years later, if at all . . . (Heidegger, 1975, p. 163/p. 165)
In Heidegger’s eyes, the fact that distant sites have become accessible in a heretofore
unprecedented way is necessarily complicit with forms of inauthenticity. He is
worried that apparent nearness of formerly far off events and people would cause
confusions and alienations such that one cannot concentrate on and preserve what
properly belongs to oneself. This conviction could account for the fact that during
his lifetime, Heidegger has never travelled further than France and Greece, which
according to him are the only two places belonging to the same lineage as Germany
does. In a letter of 1955, he could not help expressing irritation at being invited to go
to Japan.22
Heidegger feels fully justified in viewing things in such a way. However, in the
contemporary world one can no longer make sense of one’s dwelling place without
paying attention to other places that have also become part of one’s own world.
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In addition, one’s defining roles are open to changes. This in some cases may bring a
new lease of life, rather than necessarily leads to loss. Laozi’s succinct verses may lend
themselves for Heidegger to make his case. Nevertheless, in the light of a careful
analysis, his case is not supported by chapter 47 of the Daodejing.
4. You and Wu—Chapter 11
In an article entitled ‘The uniqueness of the poet’ (Die Einzigkeit des Dichters),
written in 1943 (Heidegger, 2000a), Heidegger cites the whole of chapter 11 from the
Daodejing. In this essay, he deals with the question where the uniqueness of the poet
resides. Two ready approaches offer themselves. One approach is historical, that is,
one can discover the poet’s singularity through a comparative study of poets in the
history of literature. Another approach is unhistorical, that is, one can find the
distinctive characteristics of poets in accordance with the nature (or measure) of
poetry. In the eyes of Heidegger, these two approaches, or their combination, fail to
provide an adequate answer to this question. Because they are both separated from
the originary event (Ereignis) that makes a poet poet, a poem poem, these approaches
are necessarily arbitrary, external and superficial.
In accordance with his distinction between Historie and Geschichte, Heidegger
claims that poetry can only originate in and be determined by Geschichte. He writes,
‘Were the poet to have to compose the complete essence of poetry in particular, with
this essence understood as Geschichte, that is, what is coming (Kommendes),
then . . . the uniqueness of the poet enters into light immediately’ (Heidegger, 2000a,
pp. 36–37). The unique poet Heidegger has in mind is no other than Ho¨lderlin, since
his poetry takes its origin in the coming time.
‘What is coming’, the future, characterizes the essence of time. It is intermingled
with what is past and what is present. The uniqueness of Ho¨lderlin is sent by destiny
(Schickung). His poetry is post-saying and at the same time pre-saying (nach-
sagenden Vorsagen) in response to the call (or the word) of Beyng. Ho¨lderlin’s poetry
says (dichtet) ‘that and how Beyng appropriates itself and is sent only in
appropriation and that is called destiny [Geschichte]’ (p. 37).
Now the question is whether man remains inattentive to the uniqueness of the
poet and to what is always coming, the authentic time, or tries to learn the
attentiveness, out of which we learn the originary remembrance of what is to be
thought. This is the unique historic decision man has to make. Heidegger continues:
How do we learn attentiveness, we, the late-born ones during centuries of
inattentiveness?
We learn attentiveness, in that we see the unseemingly simpleness [das unscheinbare
Einfache], which we appropriate originarily ever and ever, and before [vor] which
we become more and more awesome.23
Already the unnoticeable simplicity of simple things brings to us what we call,
according to old habit of thinking, Being [Sein] in its distinction from beings
[Seiende].
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Being in this distinction is spoken of by Lao-Tse in the eleventh saying [Spruch] of
his Tao-Te-King. (p. 42; emphasis original)
In what follows, Heidegger cites the whole of chapter 11 of the Daodejing:
Dreißig Speichen treffen die Nabe,
Aber das Leere zwischen ihnen gewa¨hrt das Sein des Rades.
Aus dem Ton ent-stehen die Gefa¨ße,
Aber das Leere in ihnen gewa¨hrt das Sein des Gefa¨ßes.
Mauern und Fenster und Tu¨ren stellen das Haus dar,
Aber das Leere zwischen ihnen gewa¨hrt das Sein des Hauses.
Das Seiende ergibt die Brauchbarkeit.
Das Nicht-Seiende gewa¨hrt das Sein. (p. 43; emphasis added)
Heidegger’s version is the closest to Ular’s translation among the four to which
Heidegger has access. It is as follows:
Dreißig Speichen treffen die Nabe,
aber das Leere zwischen ihnen erwirkt das Wesen des Rades;
Aus Ton entstehen To¨pfe,
aber das Leere in ihnen wirkt das Wesen des Topfes;
Mauern mit Fenstern und Tu¨ren bilden das Haus,
aber das Leere in ihnen erwirkt das Wesen des Hauses.
Grundsa¨tzlich:
Das Stoffliche birgt Nutzbarkeit;
Das Unstoffliche wirkt Wesenheit. (Ular, 1903, p. 17; emphasis added)
Heidegger’s text differs from Ular’s translation in several places. He changes both
erwirkt which occurs twice and wirkt which occurs once into gewa¨hrt, and puts a dash
within the word entstehen, and thus writes ent-stehen. He replaces Ular’s word To¨pfe
(qi ) with Gefa¨ße, and modifies birgt in the next to last sentence as erbirgt. He uses
zwischen twice, once more than Ular does, and replaces Ular’s Stoffliche with Seiende,
and Unstoffliche with Nicht-Seiende correspondingly. The most important change is
his replacement of Ular’s word Wesenheit (yong ), with Sein.24 Meanwhile,
Heidegger follows Ular in rendering wu ( ) as Leere.25
Below (Table 2) I provide a Chinese version as well as my paraphrasing translation
of chapter 11. I give the pinyin after the Chinese characters in order to make it easier
for the reader to locate the relevant characters.
The lack of a definite system of periodization in classical Chinese writings gives rise
to multiple possibilities of reading. One of the things important for understanding
chapter 11 concerns whether the three you characters should go with the wu character
preceding them, or with the following words to form such phrases as ‘you . . . zhi yong
ye’. Most translators or interpreters have read this text in the latter way. Accordingly
there are formed three phrases: you che zhi yong (there comes the use of a cart), you qi
zhi yong (there comes the use of a vessel), you shi zhi yong (there comes the use of a
room). In James Legge’s (1969) bilingual version, the you characters are listed in the
former way. That is, they follow the wu characters. However, Legge does not seem to
have considered seriously whether you here is functioning differently from what is
commonly assumed. Taking the you characters as going with their following words
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makes it easier to isolate wu from the particular context and interpret it as an abstract
notion.
I suggest that the first way of reading you is more adequate. That is, you
immediately follows wu. you literally means ‘to have’, ‘there exists’, as contrary to wu,
which means ‘not to be present’, or ‘not to be around’. In the three cases that involve
a particular use of a certain object (a cart, a vessel, a room), it is more convincing to
attribute what makes such a use possible to both the space or void where there is
nothing (wu) and the concrete tangible materials that make the space or void what it
is (you) than only to the former (wu). That is, wu is not an abstract philosophical
notion. It refers to the particular space. In the penultimate line, you appears as a word
on itself, followed by the word zhi. zhi is here used as a pronoun to represent the
things that are said to be present in the previous cases: the thirty spokes, the clay
shape of the vessel, the walls of a room. In this light, it is rather incredible to explain
away the role you plays in the earlier occurrence by taking it as a word that forms the
phrases ‘there comes the use of a cart’, ‘there comes the use of a vessel’ and ‘there
comes the use of a room’. A. C. Graham’s reading supports my explanation.
According to him,
[this chapter deals] not with Nothing in general, but with the parts of the wheel,
vessel or house which do not exist (qi wu). Each is a combination of something and
nothing; the hole in the wheel which takes the axle, the empty space inside the
vessel, doors and windows in the house, are nothing yet belong to the things which
could not be used without them. (Graham, 1990, p. 346)26
The point of my discussion about the meaning of wuyou resides in the following.
Treating the word wu as unrelated to you and translating it as ‘nothing’, or ‘Leere’ as
Heidegger adopts, enhances the tendency to regarding it as a metaphysical term.
Table 2 Chapter 11 of the Daodejing.
sa fu gong yi gu Thirty spokes unite round a nave.
dang qi wu you
che zhi yong ye
Adapting the space between the
spokes [wu] and the spokes
themselves [you], one uses it as a cart.
shan zhi er wei qi Moulding clay to make a vessel.
dang qi wu you
qi zhi yong ye
Adapting the void within the vessel
[wu] and the shape of the vessel
itself [you], one uses it as a vessel.
zao hu you er wei shi Cutting out doors and windows out
of walls to make a room.
dang qi wu you
shi zhi yong ye
Adapting the space of the doors and
windows [wu] and the walls that
stand on the ground [you], one
uses it as a room.
you zhi yi wei li Where something is present [you zhi],
it makes a basis for adapting.
wu zhi yi wei yong Where nothing is present [wu zhi],
it leads to an actual use.
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For example, Lin Yutang’s translation is, ‘From their not-being (loss of their
individuality)/Arises the utility of the wheel’. D. C. Lau’s is, ‘Adapt the nothing
therein to the purpose in hand,/and you will have the use of the cart’. Victor Mair
pays attention to the concreteness of wu, ‘but it is the empty hole in the middle which
makes a cart possible’. However, in the last verse he renders wu as an abstract notion:
‘Therefore, while benefits may be derived from something,/it is in EMPTY
NOTHING that we find usefulness’ (emphasis original).27
Here I would follow current established interpretation of you and wu. According to
this view, the classical Western metaphysical notion of Being is generally conceived as
ontological ground, or reality behind appearance, while Non-Being constitutes its
strict negation. In Chinese thought, the word you overlaps with the sense of ‘having’.
It has nothing to do with ‘Being’ or existence. wu does not indicate strict opposition
or contradiction, but absence. While you means ‘to be present’ or ‘to be around’,
wu means ‘to not be present’ or ‘to not be around’. Thus, the you–wu distinction
suggests contrast in the sense of presence or absence of x rather than assertion about
the existence or non-existence of x. you and wu should not be treated as ontological
categories with loads of metaphysical implications, but as interdependent explanatory
categories of ‘something’ and ‘nothing’, of ‘presence and absence’.28
Heidegger may have found the word Leere (as translating wu) in Ular’s
translation very interesting and corresponding to his way of philosophizing. In the
essay ‘The thing’ written in 1950, he speaks at length of the Leere (emptiness) of
the jug. This point of Daoist connection has been noticed by a few scholars
without the knowledge that Heidegger quotes the whole of chapter 11 that
contains important verses bearing on wu.29 In ‘A dialogue on language’, he talks
about the ‘sameness’ between the Japanese notion of Leere (ku ) and his idea of
Nothing (Heidegger, 1959, p. 108). Nevertheless, granted that Heidegger has
learned such apt expressions as Leere from Laozi, his learning is always subject to
fundamental orientations of his thought. While paying attention to the emptiness
of the jug, he claims that the ‘thingliness’ of the jug consists in earth from which
it comes to be and by virtue of which the jug can be self-supporting. In addition,
the implication of the word ‘sameness’ in Heidegger’s pairing of Leere as a
Japanese notion and his idea of Nothing is multifaceted and cannot be dealt with
here because of limitation of space. Briefly speaking, Heidegger’s ‘sameness’ is not
the same as ‘same’ in its ordinary sense.
In addition, Heidegger’s translation of yong as Sein, in contrast with Seiende and
Nicht-Seiende in the last two verses indicates the extent to which he has taken liberty
with Laozi’s saying. For sure, it is as an exemplification of Being in its distinction
from beings that chapter 11 of the Daodejing is brought into Heidegger’s text.
After citing it, Heidegger explains:
In this word [by Laozi] there resides the hint, which says that that which as the
between [das Zwischen] of everything, first holds itself open, and distances in
the distance [Weite] of the duration [Weile] and region [Gegend], which to us
may too easily and too often appear as something without significance [das
Nichtige]. (p. 43)
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Admittedly, Laozi’s text is open to multiple interpretations. However, it seems
impossible for Laozi to have said exactly what Heidegger makes him to say.
5. Paraphrasing Translations from Chapter 15
One year after their attempt at translating the Daodejing in the summer of 1946,
Heidegger sent Hsiao a short letter of greetings (dated 9 October 1947), in which he
cites from chapter 15 of the Daodejing:
‘Wer kann still sein und aus der Stille durch sie auf den Weg bringen (be-wegen)
etwas so, dass es zum Erscheinen kommt?’
[Wer vermag es, stillend etwas so ins Sein zu bringen? Des Himmels Tao]
‘Who is able to be still and from and through stillness move something on to the
Way so that it comes to shine forth?’
[Who is able through making still to bring something into Being? The Tao of
heaven]30
It may have been through his collaboration with Hsiao that Heidegger was
particularly impressed by these two verses. They were apparently dear to his heart, as
he had requested Hsiao to explain the original Chinese words one by one and to write
them out in traditional Chinese calligraphy on a pair of vertical parchment rolls.
Hsiao added a horizontal scroll with two characters tiandao (the dao of heaven)
to form a standard set. This set of calligraphy hung in Heidegger’s study (Petzet,
1993, p. 168). In Chinese they are:
shu neng zhuo yi jing zhi xu qing
Muddy water, when stilled, slowly becomes clear
shu neng an yi dong zhi xu sheng
Something settled, when agitated, slowly comes to life
The Wang Bi and the Guodian versions of the Daodejing have the words shu
neng in the beginning of both lines (which literally means ‘who could’); whereas
the Mawangdui A and B versions do not contain these words. The English
translation I choose dispenses with these two characters (Ames & Hall, 2003,
p. 98). This seems to be more consistent with the preceding verses, which are a
series of descriptions of ancient dao masters. Von Strauss (1924) and Wilhelm’s
(1911) translations are, respectively, ‘Wer kann das Tru¨be, indem er es stillt,
allma¨hlich kla¨ren? Wer kann die Ruhe, in dem er sie verla¨ngert, allma¨hlich
beleben?’ (p. 80) and ‘Wer kann (wie sie) das Tru¨be durch Stille allma¨hlich
kla¨ren/Wer kann (wie sie) die Ruhe durch Dauer allma¨hlich erzeugen?’ (p. 17).31
These two versions are very close to Hsiao’s own German translation, ‘Wer kann
das Tru¨be stillend allma¨hlich kla¨ren? Wer kann die Ruhe bewegend allma¨hlich
beleben? (Hsiao, 1977, p. 127).32 An English translation of this is, ‘Who can,
settling the muddy, gradually make it clear? Who can, stirring the tranquil,
gradually bring it to life?’ (Hsiao, 1987, p. 100).
It can be seen, in comparison with these translations, Heidegger has obviously
found something bearing affinity to his way of saying. One example is the word Stille
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and its cognates. In von Strauss and Hsiao’s German versions there occur the words
stillt and stillend, both of which come from the verb stillen, meaning ‘to settle, to
stop’. Apart from stillen, Heidegger also uses the adjective word still, meaning ‘quiet,
secret’, and the noun Stille, meaning ‘silence, quietness’. He may have been inspired
by Wilhelm’s phrase ‘durch Stille’ and may have derived the expression ‘aus der Stille’
from it.
Heidegger’s use of Stille as a technical notion has so far been rarely noted. As early
as 1936–38, he employs this word in the Contributions to Philosophy (From Ereignis):
‘In and as da-sein, Beyng enowns the truth which it manifests as not-granting, as that
domain of hinting and withdrawal—of stillness—wherein the arrival and flight of
the last god are first determined’ (Heidegger, 1999, p. 15/p. 20). ‘Stillness’ indicates
the region that gives hints and at the same time withdraws itself. Toward the end
of the essay ‘Language’, almost two pages are devoted to Stille. It is delineated in the
same manner as Ereignis (Heidegger, 1959, pp. 29–30). In ‘A dialogue on language’,
Stille is used to characterize the Japanese notion iki: ‘iki is the breath of the stillness of
luminous delight (ibid., p. 141). Stille and Weite (vastness) form the pairing mode in
which Ereignis occurs (ibid., p. 153).
It remains difficult to decide whether Heidegger drew inspirations concerning
Stille from his reading of German versions of the Daodejing before he met Hsiao, or
he happened to find striking similarity of wording in Laozi’s verses after he
collaborated with Hsiao. In any case, it can be seen that certainly Heidegger is very
fond of the image this word denotes in using it three times in his version of the
verses.
An innovation Heidegger makes with the couplet is his use of the wordWeg, which
is neither in the original text nor in its translations. Furthermore, instead of the more
or less literal translation of kla¨ren (qing ) Heidegger uses the expression ‘zum
Erscheinen kommt’ (comes to shine forth). Erscheinen, signifying ‘appearance,
phenomenon’, is strongly suggestive of Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology.
According to Hsiao’s report, Heidegger told him that one could extend some of
the motives in these two sayings and consider the idea that ‘clarifying finally brings
something to light, and subtle motion in the tranquil and still can bring something
into being’ (Hsiao, 1987, p. 100). It is clear that Heidegger has changed the literal
translation beleben (sheng ) in the second verse into the phrase ‘ins Sein zu bringen’
(bring something into Being). This is completely of Heidegger’s own innovation. It
seems that he would never fail to coin different phrases to express his concern with
Being. In the meantime, Heidegger has completely neglected the words Tru¨be (zhuo
) and allma¨hlich (xu ).
One could conclude that the alleged citation from chapter 15 of the Daodejing
in Heidegger’s letter is an integration of his own ideas with Laozi’s saying. It resulted
from ignoring irrelevant words while highlighting relevant ones. As May rightly
explains, the verse in quotation marks is Heidegger’s appropriated paraphrase on the
basis of the collaboration with Hsiao; while the verse following the square bracket
‘can be ascribed to Heidegger alone’ (May, 1996, pp. 2–3).
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6. A Struggle between Technology and Art?—Chapters 9 and 15
On 7 August 1965, Heidegger gave a brief speech on the occasion of the seventieth
birthday of Siegfried Bro¨se (Heidegger, 2000b). Bro¨se is Heidegger’s friend, working
with the Freiburg Art Society. He had organized an exhibition on Chinese art, which
would open the day after Heidegger delivered his speech. Heidegger started his talk
by saying that he wanted to hold on to ‘a word’ (ein Wort) from Laozi’s book ‘Vom
Weg’, which also spoke for Bro¨se. He quoted the translation by Ulenbrook of the
following lines from chapter 9 of the Daodejing:
Dem Werk nachgehen,
sich selbst entziehen,
das ist des Himmels Weg.
In Chinese they are:
gong sui sheng tui, tian zhi dao ye
To withdraw when the work is done is the way of heaven.33
Laozi’s chapter 9 purports to draw analogy between the way of heaven and the way
of human conduct. When the vessel is filled to its brim, it will fall over; when the
blade is made too sharp, it will not hold its edge; when there is abundant treasure one
may not be able to maintain it. Wealth and station may well incur calamity.
Therefore, one should try to avoid excess or extremes and keep to a life of
moderation and balance. To retreat when the deed is accomplished accords with the
way of heaven.
Heidegger states that artworks from a profound tradition of four-thousand-year
old constitute the thought from which the exhibition on Chinese art has sprung
(entsprungen). This tradition has entered the technological world-epoch in the last
decade of the nineteenth century. Its artworks are now presented at a moment when
the power of scientific technology is dominating forms of experience. Heidegger
suggests that instead of following the latest technical innovations, art should engage
in a struggle (Widerstreit) between the restfulness of the work of art and the raging of
technology. This is a struggle in which art is in the process of losing. Following
this, Heidegger remarks that the thinking of the ancient Chinese world may have
pre-thought this struggle in its own way (Heidegger, 2000b, p. 618).
It can be seen that, in quoting the verse ‘To withdraw when the work is done is the
way of heaven’, Heidegger has borrowed and at the same time revised the thought
embodied in it. Originally, this saying concerns an analogy between the way of
heaven and the way of humans. The implication is that one should not be over-
relying on one’s achievements and become dominated by it. Instead, it is better to let
alone what is accomplished, rather than taking advantage of the benefits coming with
it. This rule resembles the cyclical patterns of nature in which one season gives way
to the next, with the full range of natural forces playing their roles in due course.
In this way, the environment always remains lively.
For Heidegger, ‘To withdraw when the work is done is the way of heaven’ means
something different from the above. He reads into this verse a depiction of the
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struggle between technology and art. Although he does not specify the details in
which this could be understood, what he has in mind may be something like this: to
stay in a triumphant and dominant position is the way of the Ge-stell. What needs to
be cherished is the way of letting-be as manifest in art. The way of art is well depicted
in the verses he cites.
In order to enhance his point, in the same lecture, Heidegger also quotes from
chapter 15 of the Daodejing (Heidegger, 2000b, p. 618):
Wer aber ist imstande, ein quirlend Wasser
durch die Behutsamkeit der Stille zu kla¨ren?
Wer aber ist imstande, die Ruhe
durch die Behutsamkeit dauernder Bewegung zu erzeugen?
These are exactly the same verses as covered in the previous section, where I have
discussed Heidegger’s own paraphrasing of them. On this occasion, he quotes from
Ulenbrook’s translation (published in 1962) without any modification. For him,
the modes of kla¨ren and erzeugen represent something like the restful ways of art.
This pair of verses is the one Heidegger likes the most and cites most often. Among
Heidegger’s Nachlass, there is a letter addressed to Andrea von Harbou dated 6
August 1965, one day before he delivered this lecture in relation to the exhibition on
Chinese art. In this letter, he quotes exactly the same verses of chapter 15 as translated
by Ulenbrook.34 It seems that Heidegger was aware that his own version of these
verses in the letter to Hsiao in 1947 diverged significantly from what is being said in
the original text. Thus, in quoting them on these two occasions, he deemed it suitable
to use an existing translation. He might also have considered that Ulenbrook’s
translation surpasses the others or captures well what he wanted to express.
On reading a collection of essays by Erhart Ka¨stner, Heidegger for the last time
refers to this pair of verses in a letter to the author on 30 July 1973. In a short essay
entitled ‘Quirlwasser’ in that book, Ka¨stner discusses whether Tru¨bwasser (turbid
water) or Quirlwasser (whirling water) might be the best translation of the word zhuo
in chapter 15 of the Daodejing. He concludes that it might be better not to decide
for one or the other, but to keep both in view (Ka¨stner, 1973, pp. 59–62). Heidegger
comments that he finds Ka¨stner’s reading of chapter 15 ‘nice and convincing’
(Heidegger & Ka¨stner, 1986, p. 122).
7. Conclusion
My scrutiny of Heidegger’s reference to dao and of his citations from the Daodejing
so far discovered, I hope, could help us obtain a clear vision of his complex relation
with Daoist thinking. Because of his exacerbating worry about the Ge-stell, Heidegger
has occasionally considered the possibility that ancient Asian thought, Daoist
thinking in particular, insofar as it is unaffected by the Ge-stell, may be of help to the
enactment of the other beginning of Western historicality. Nevertheless, he has all
along kept the way in which Daoist thinking could play a role within the limit of his
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own Denkweg. As I argue in Section 1, it is Weg, not dao, that is Heidegger’s proper
Leitwort.
Despite obvious affinities between Heidegger’s locution and Laozi’s, there are
crucial differences in their concerns and orientations, some of which I sketch in
Section 2. In Section 3, we observe Heidegger’s severe criticism against what are for
him alien and exotic foreign things. This tells against some scholars’ presentation of
him as a transcultural thinker. In Sections 4 and 5, we see Heidegger’s heavy-handed
modifications of Laozi’s verses in order to suit them to his central concern with
Being. His most innovative renditions are: using Sein four times to translate the
original yong character in chapter 11 (rendered as Wesen and Wesenheit by Ular) and
grafting a concern with Being to chapter 15 in adding the phrase ins Sein zu bringen.
In the last section, we see how Heidegger’s anxiety about the Ge-stell led him to
consider the possibility that ancient Chinese thought might have something to
contribute. Nevertheless, in borrowing from chapter 9, Heidegger all the same revised
the thought embodied in it so that his citation could fit well into his pre-
conceived scheme of thought.
Some scholars such as Cho, !Ohashi and Zhang consider that Heidegger’s reflection
on dao has brought out its true meaning and his integration of passages from the
Daodejing into the fundamental question of Being has demonstrated the depth and
profundity of his engagement with ancient Chinese Daoist thinking. These views
need to be seen in the light of the fact that dao has for long been treated as a typical
Chinese philosophical term and has been compared with various Western concepts.
This paves the way for a relatively easy acceptance of yet another new interpretation.
Certainly, one can find a large number of strikingly similar phrases and ideas in
Heidegger’s writings when compared with the Daodejing; yet, while it surely sounds
absurd to reason on this basis that it is Heidegger who has exerted influence on Laozi,
contemporary understanding and interpretations of Laozi’s Daodejing may well have
been under the sway of Heidegger’s thoughts as well as his image as the philosopher.
Notes
[1] See Paul Shih-yi Hsiao (1977) and (1987). According to Hsiao, ‘a tenth of the work had been
completed’ (Hsiao, 1987, p. 97).
[2] Chan Wing-tsit (1963) and A. C. Graham (1989) have questioned the legitimacy of
attributing the authorship of the Daodejing to a single person called Laozi. In this paper I use
the name ‘Laozi’ as the implied author(s) of the verses from the Daodejing.
[3] When applicable I give the pagination of Heidegger’s work in the order of English version
followed by the German original, and use ‘tr. m.’ to stand for ‘translation modified’. The
year in the reference accords to what appears in the ‘References’. I often omit Heidegger’s
name and the year in a section where a particular work of his is under focus.
[4] The etymological details that Heidegger provides pertain so closely to the German language
that the English translator has simply omitted the relevant paragraph.
[5] The first quotation is from Hegel (1971, Vol. 18, p. 146); the second from Hegel (1982,
Vol. II, p. 556); the third again from Hegel (1971, Vol. 12, p. 71).
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[6] Stanislaw Julien translates dao as voie: Le livre de la voie et de la vertu (Paris: L’Impre´merie
Royale, 1842). The common English translation of dao is ‘way’. For example, Waley, Arthur
(1934) The Way and its Power. New York: Grove Press.
[7] The German translations Heidegger has used are: Victor von Strauss (1870), Alexander Ular
(1903), Richard Wilhelm (1911), and Jan Ulenbrook (1962). Von Strauss was a Sinologist
with many scholarly publications. His version adopts the prose style without line breaks.
Ular claimed that his version was based on a close reading of the components of pictorial
Chinese characters. According to him, this is the only way by which one could have access
to the meaning of this ancient work. Wilhelm was a protestant minister and missionary to
China. Ulenbrook offers two translations: a character-by-character literal one and an
interpretative one. Heidegger’s favorite is this one, from which he quotes with little
modification in his later correspondence. All these four translations went through several
reprints. By present academic standards, the translation by Ulenbrook is more professional;
yet Wilhelm’s version is the one that has been the most widely read.
[8] Reinhard May (1996, pp. 35–44) and Zhang (1996, pp. 424–454; repeated in 1998,
pp. 315–328) claim that Heidegger’s use of dao in these two paragraphs show that he is
pursuing transcultural thinking.
[9] Cho’s idea is shared by other scholars such as !Ohashi Ry !osuke (1989) and Zhang Xianglong
(1998).
[10] Po¨ggeler considers that Heidegger’s connection of Weg and bewegen is etymologically
plausible in German, but these words do not belong together in Chinese (1999, p. 113).
[11] In the original publication of the lecture ‘Basic principles of thinking’ in Jahrbuch fu¨r
Psychologie und Psychotherapie, Vol. 6 (1959), it is incorrectly printed, ‘Laotse sagt (Kap.
XVII; u¨bersetzt von V. v. Strauss)’. In the English translation by Hart and Maraldo (1976),
this mistake is retained: ‘Lao Tzu says (Ch. 17)’, and the reference to von Strauß is deleted.
Although this is corrected in the Gesamtausgabe (Vol. 79, 1994) with more detailed
bibliographic information provided in a note (p. 93), the mistaken reference to chapter 17
(instead of 28) has been repeated throughout the secondary literature (e.g. Elberfeld, 2000,
p. 154; Zimmermann, 1981, p. 256). Henceforth I refer to this lecture as Heidegger (1976).
[12] Ular’s translation is, ‘to feel oneself as clear, to show oneself as dark’ (Klar sich fu¨hlen, dunkel
sich zeigen) (p. 20); Wilhelm’s translation is, ‘Who recognizes light, and nevertheless dwells
in darkness’ (Wer Licht erkennt, und dennoch im Dunkel weilt) (p. 30). Almost all English
translators render the word bai literally as ‘white’, or ‘whiteness’, and take this verse as
illustrating the relation between polarities.
[13] Other pairs of contraries mentioned in chapter 28 of the Daodejing are male versus female,
and clean versus soiled.
[14] Po¨ggeler’s interpretation of Heidegger’s use of Laozi’s verse is quite different from mine. He
puts emphasis on the phrase ‘dark light’ in Ho¨lderlin’s verses, which Heidegger quotes
before citing from the Daodejing. Po¨ggeler connects the ‘dark light’ with the red Bordeaux of
southern France. In the wine pressed from the grapes Ho¨lderlin sees the fruit of earth and
sky. Po¨ggeler explains, ‘Humans, who live in a world which features a finite historical
openness from the midst of a concealing mystery, are themselves a light that must conceal
itself in the darkness of that mystery’ (Po¨ggeler, 1998, p. 281). According to Po¨ggeler, the
theme of Laozi’s chapter 28 concerns the unity within which male and female, light and
dark, honour and disgrace are combined. Compared with this, the light that science and
technology bring into the world is destructive in its measureless glare. Po¨ggeler considers
that the contraries used in Laozi’s chapter can be interconnected with Heidegger’s
characterization of the world as a ‘limited openness of a livable world’ (ibid.). However,
he does not address Heidegger’s twist in using Laozi’s verse.
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[15] Cf. Heidegger (1998).
[16] Cf. D. C. Lau (1958, p. 350).
[17] See Heidegger Nachlaß catalogue number 85.3/17; also cited in Petzet (1993, p. 181). In the
1983 German edition of this book, Petzet ascribes the translation to Richard Wilhelm. This
is corrected in the English translation. Ernst Ju¨nger (1895–1998) is a well-known novelist
and essayist. In the early period of his career, he was allegedly an ardent militarist and
nihilist. This outlook changed in the 1940s to one characterized by a strong belief in peace,
European federation and individual dignity.
[18] Ular translates this sentence as ‘Ohne hinauszusehen, kann man durchschauen’ (p. 34);
Wilhelm’s translation is ‘Ohne aus dem Fenster zu blicken, kann man des Himmels SINN
erschauen’ (p. 52); von Strauss’ version is, ‘nicht ausblickend durchs Fenster, sieht man des
Himmels Weg’ (p. 214).
[19] Cf. Heidegger (1975).
[20] A defense of Heidegger is that he is only disparaging the superficial and insignificant foreign,
while concerned with the authentic foreign. I have shown in another writing that the
authentic foreign Heidegger has in mind is the Greek.
[21] Ames and Hall think that phrases in D. C. Lau’s translation of chapter 47 such as ‘By not
setting foot outside the door . . .’ and ‘By not looking out of the window . . .’ are suggestive of
this idea (p. 151).
[22] Heidegger writes, ‘To be someone with a famous name is a gruesome thing. Even the
Foreign Institute in Stuttgart has sought me out here and has sent a Japanese person,
who invited me to Japan for several months during next year’ [2001, p. 251; emphasis
original].
[23] The word vor which Heidegger emphasizes may indicate a sense of future. We are before the
unseemingly simplicity, since it is always coming.
[24] Von Strauss translates yong as Gebrauch, Wilhelm translates it as Werk.
[25] Von Strauss’s translation of wu is Nichtseyn; Wilhelm’s is Nichts except for Nichtsein on the
last occasion.
[26] A Chinese author claims for the same way of periodization as mine. But the point he makes
out of this is different. He argues that wu is as important as you, both being abstract notions
(He Shibin, 2005, p. 41). Zhu Qianzhi’s version (1996) of this chapter also reads you as going
with wu.
[27] All the above quotations are from http://home.pages.at/onkellotus.
[28] See Ames and Hall (2003, p. 91) and A. C. Graham (1990, pp. 343–351).
[29] For example, May (1996, pp. 30–31); Wohlfart (2003) considers that Heidegger may have
been inspired by the original meaning of the Chinese character wu .
[30] Hsiao (1987, 102–3). Quotation marks original; there is only one square bracket in the
original manuscript.
[31] Ular’s rendering of these two lines is,
Wer von den Jetzigen du¨rfte, durch seiner Klarheit Gro¨sse,
die innere Finsternis kla¨ren?
Wer von den Jetzigen du¨rfte, durch seines Lebens Gro¨sse,
den inneren Tod beleben? (p. 12)
[32] In Hsiao’s ‘literal’ Italian translation the two lines read ‘non trabocca mai/e poiche`
non trabocca.’
[33] Heidegger indicated the source as, ‘IX. Spruch (u¨bers. v. J. Ulenbrook [Bremen:
Schu¨nemann 1962])’ (Heidegger, 2000b, p. 617).
[34] Heidegger Nachlaß, catalogue number 94.143.2/7 (Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach).
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